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ABSTRACT
In "Markets and Hierarchies" (1975) Oliver Williamson has developed
a heuristic framework (Organization Failures Framework = OFF) to attack the
issue of institutional borderlines between markets and firms. Below we
discuss this concept and apply it to local coal markets. Differences in
larger domestic and international coal markets then cast some doubts on
the practical usefulness of the approach.
1. Organizational Failure
In the absence of a complete set of futures markets, economic theorists
have used an array of arguments to explain the prevalence of vertical
integration (and simultaneously of long-term contracts) in a competitive
situation. These arguments relate to technological interdependencies,
externalities, incomplete information and uncertainty. Technological
interdependencies tend to create a natural bilateral monopoly situation
(Von Weizscker, 1978), at least ex post. Externalities on intermediate
goods markets can be internalized by more or less sophisticated methods of
vertical control (Warren-Boulton, 1978). Finally, incomplete information
and uncertainty could come in for at least three different reasons (EPRI,
1978). First, vertical integration may allow agents to convey information
which otherwise cannot costlessly be transferred from one side of the market
to the other (Arrow, 1975). Secondly, should price rigidity prevent market
clearing, vertical integration could come in as a means of assuring input
supplies (Green, 1974, Carlton, 1979). This relates to Weitzman's (1974)
prices vs. quantities problem: if profits are more sensitive to input
quantities than to input prices, it pays to secure such quantities on a
long-term basis. This becomes relevant for production techniques of the
putty-clay type and then especially for inputs with a low input-output
coefficient. Thirdly, securing intermediate input may be a hedging strategy
for buyers who face a steady demand of their own output. In this sense Oi
and Hurter (1965) have interpreted vertical integration as an insurance. A
combination of these arguments for vertical integration is used in the
institutionally oriented "Theory of the Firm" literature dating back to
Coase (1937). In its latest version represented by Williamson (1975) this
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literature offers a package of conditions to explain the superiority of
vertical integration over long-term contracts, futures markets and sequential
spot contracts. Below in this section we shall briefly introduce Williamson's
"Organizational Failures Framework" (OFF). Then we describe the features of
local coal markets in its terms in order to demonstrate the limits and
possibilities of its empirical applicability. This will result in some
qualifications, which Williamson partly makes himself but not so strongly.
First, we argue that not only internal organization may be improved in
evolutionary and innovative ways but that the same applies to market trans-
actions: new situations call for new contract terms. Second, as shown
in the examples below, vertical integration and market contracting may serve
different purposes and thus be highly imperfect substitutes for each other.
Sometimes they could even be complements. Third, government may interfere
with or supplant the result predicted by the OFF, e.g., in order to cure
perceived market failures, or effect income redistribution.
The traditional neoclassic approach to explain the choice between
transaction modes follows a hierarchy. As a general rule, spot markets are
deemed to be optimal. However, if they fail to give the right productive
signals futures markets are introduced. If such markets do not work, due to
lack of partners or small numbers of transactions, long-term contracts
replace them. These contracts are assumed to be allocated using a
competitive bidding process. Should threat of breach or incompleteness due
to complexity of future events pose problems, vertical integration is the
ultimate solution. In terms of neoclassical theory all these failures can
potentially be cured also by government intervention as a substitute.
The described hierarchy is only valid if diseconomies of another kind
increase as one moves from one step to the next. These diseconomies are
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costs of organization or foregone opportunities. They may be explained by
the absence of an invisible hand (X-inefficiency, etc.). Only if the costs
of using the different transaction modes are fully spelled out, can the
failure hierarchy be replaced by a more symmetric treatment. Although
Williamson does not consistently succeed in doing so, he makes an important
(semantic) step in the right direction by replacing market failure with
organizational failure. In my view, on the basis of private costs only, the
neoclassical assumption of increasing organizational costs down the hierarchy
is based on correct observations even though it does not explicitly
incorporate the overall costs of a legal system necessary for the provision
of property rights. These are mostly sunk costs (born by past generations)
which marginally do not interfere with the hierarchical line. Furthermore,
these legal costs stand for a public good, whereas the decision on the
transactional mode by individuals is a private one though it usually involves
externalities.
We do not fully develop Williamson's OFF here (for this, see Williamson,
1975, passim) but only give a summary. He regards market exchange and
internal organization as transaction modes that may substitute for each other.
On transactional efficiency grounds, four factors shall determine the choice
to integrate vertically instead of using the market. These are:
a) Uncertainty/complexity in combination with bounded human
rationality refers to limitations in formulating and executing
contracts due to the complexity of problems ("chess") or uncertainty
of future events.
Whereas uncertainty and complexity do call for simplification it is not
a priori clear that simplification through hierarchy is in general superior
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to simplification through contract rules. Williamson (1975, p. 25) observes
that adaptive, sequential decision processes economize greatly on bounded
rationality. Thus indeed, in this respect they seemingly top off markets.
Neither a full set of state contingent markets nor a complete contingent
claims contract is feasible. However, such a direct comparison does no
justice to the subject. The strength of markets to economize on bounded
rationality lies in providing relief ("Entlastung" according to Arnold Gehlen)
from complexities. Markets do not always directly solve but circumvent or
dissolve problems. Typical indirect market institutions are securities and
money, which can be sold at a later date avoiding a decision now.
b) Small numbers problems in combination with opportunism refer to the
possibility of self-seeking interest with guile that exists when
partners to a transaction are limited in the choice of alternative
options.
Opportunism, according to Williamson, arises when an agent can
successfully mislead his partner regarding his behavior in future transac-
tions. Hence, it comes close to the more familiar economic term "moral
hazard." This possibility is stated to exist in small numbers bargaining
situations where there is no market alternative. This point remains vague
and therefore is hard to evaluate.l Especially, Williamson does not say if
he wants to have the argument restricted to certain number configurations.
In my view this reasoning, if true, may be applied to all situations where
at least on one side of the transaction there is no alternative partner
(low mobility). A monopolist (monopsonist) can show opportunistic behavior
vis-a-vis any number of customers (suppliers). This most obviously holds
for predatory competition, which is defined by a change in behavior before
and after someone has become a monopolist (monopsonist). It also is the
problem of limit pricing strategies.
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A fortiori, the opportunism argument holds in the case of bilateral
monopolies. But opportunism is limited even in this case by the possibilities
of (fluctual) changes in the situation and by government policy. In a
bilateral monopoly situation, market conditions may fluctuate and then long-
term strategies will counteract opportunistic ones. Government policies
interfering with opportunism are to be found in antitrust or tax policies
and the threat of nationalization.
In oligopolistic situations I expect the opportunism argument to be
limited by the goodwill factor. If there is perfect competition between
sellers, goodwill does not matter. Everyone is free to behave opportunistically
within the narrow limits set by competition. If there are but few sellers,
however, goodwill is generally a valuable asset that can be lost through
opportunistic behavior. Brand names for instance only keep their value as
long as certain qualitative promises are kept. Furthermore, the rigid
pricing hypothesis (Means, 1935) received its possible strength from the
argument that firms with market power smooth out certain kinds of uncer-
tainty. Now, this may also be termed "opportunistic behavior." But in any
case, it possibly offsets uncertainty and therefore makes sequential spot
contracting viable. Then, small numbers (oligopolies) would not necessarily
favor vertical integration and long-term contracts, because existing market
power is preferably used for increasing the asset "goodwill" than for
boosting short-term profits. We shall examine this argument more extensively
with respect to coal markets.
c) Information impactedness "exists when true underlying circumstances
relevant to the transaction, or related set of transactions, are
known to one or more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned
by or displayed for others" (Williamson, 1975, p. 31).
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This factor is therefore the combination of uncertainty, opportunism
and bounded rationality. A prime example is the moral hazard problem of
insurance. But clearly, the new item here is that information impactedness
impedes correct decisions even if agents behave faithfully. This is other-
wise known as the problem of adverse selection. On markets where only
sellers hold the correct information on quality, we thus expect lemons to
expel the better quality products, as long as nonmarket alternatives are
available to potential sellers.
d) Atmosphere shall take care of the preferences people hold for one
or the other transaction mode.
If individual preferences within a society vary, this allows different
transaction modes to be used simultaneously for the same kind of transaction
but by different people.
Regarding the choice between transactions through vertical integration
and through markets, Williamson's principal hypothesis is that the presence
of the first three factors implies vertical integration. Two questions are
either not dealt with or are left vague. Is the intensity of influence of
the factors a quantitative variable and are there trade-offs between the
factors?
In trying to apply the OFF to coal markets, we face the problem of
matching it with the characteristics of the trade. For local coal markets
it is rather easy to show the sheer presence of the factors described by
Williamson, but it will be hard to measure them. Furthermore, when turning
to long-distance and international coal trade we face the difficulty of
weighing them against offsetting factors that favor contracts and are
essentially of the same nature.
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This, of course, is a necessary condition for the OFF to be more than
a disguised market failure framework. If the full set of Williamson's factors
explains the replacement of the market by which vertical integration It is
either a market failure framework only or it does not explain at all.
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2. The Organizational Failures Framework Applied to Local Coal Markets
2.1 Some Hypotheses on the Institutional Choice in Local Coal Markets
Coal trade links the three broad stages: mining (including coal prepara-
tion), transportation (including conveyors, railways, barges, dumping, ocean
transport) and consumption. The trade may involve the aid of intermediaries.
Regarding the consumption stage, we shall restrict ourselves to electricity
generation and steel-making. Currently these two types of consumers clearly
predominate. Regarding mining and consumption areas we deal separately with
local, large domestic, and international markets. In all three types of
markets long-term contracts by far outweigh spot transactions in terms of
quantities. Vertical integration is found in all three, but in the absence
of government intervention dominates long-term contracts on local markets
only.
Coal is by no means a homogeneous commodity. Qualities differ at least
with respect to coking or blending properties, heating value, and ingredients
which influence handling of the coal (properties of the ash, grindability),
air pollution (sulphur, volatile matter and ash content), and corrosion
(chlorine, phosphorus).
Coal is a nonrenewable resource, but known reserves are large relative
to known reserves of other fuels. However, some coal quantities like coking
and low sulphur coals are much less abundant than others, giving rise to
rents. These are bounded by all coal qualities being substitutes in the
sense that alone or in a blend they can be used for the same purposes at
some additional costs. Hence, the bulk of all coal deposits may be viewed
as a backstop resource for particular coal qualities. Still, unless offset
by technical progress, cumulative mining costs in the industry rise over time.
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Coal mining technology, except for a comparatively small fringe of
readily accessible deposits, involves substantial investment in shafts and/or
equipment ranging from $20 million to $2 billion. Expected mine life ranges
from 20 to 30 years.2 Investment decisions have to be made 5 to 10 years in
advance to allow for planning, legal permits and construction.
On the consumption side, scale economies call for minimum optimally
sized electric power stations as well as steelworks to cost hundreds of
million dollars in initial investment. The life expectations and lead times
of these facilities do not differ substantially from those of coal mines.3
Electricity generating firms are often regulated utilities holding a local
or regional monopoly position. Otherwise, electricity generation involves
wholesale activities in bilateral oligopoly markets which are not necessarily
regulated. Here long term sales contracts for electricity prevail. The
demand for electricity has grown at quite a steady rate over the past
decades, but today an extrapolation of this trend is no longer warranted in
highly industrialized Western countries.
Coal-fired power stations can be built flexibly, to burn different
quantities of coal or even other fuels such as oil. More flexibility
normally means higher investments in storage space, blending facilities,
boilers, etc. Furthermore, thermal efficiency has to be sacrificed for
flexibility. Because fuel is the only variable input, the competitiveness
(or use) of single power stations crucially depends on fuel costs, which
again are highly influenced by the transportation factor. Location of coal-
fired power stations is therefore either oriented toward specific coal mines
or toward having access to cheap transportation modes like rivers or the sea.
Steelworks on the other hand use ore as a second important variable
input, but so far are much more dependent on a narrow range of scarce coal
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qualities. Even within this range a switch from one supply source to another
may create high setup costs and a distinct deterioration in the quality of
output. Steel producers face strong market fluctuations for their products,
which influence their input procurement behavior.
Government interventions which substantially influence the transaction
mode and thus could enter our problem are:
a) regulations on the siting of power stations, steel plants, and on
allowed emissions of pollutants.
b) direct restrictions on vertical integration imposed by regulatory
agencies. A power company may thus be forbidden to integrate at
all into coal mining or only be prevented from selling the coal on
the market.
c) fuel clauses in the sale of electricity
d) Averch-Johnson type distortions in the use of capital and fuel as
inputs caused by rate of return regulation.
All these factors tend to complicate the empirical testing of hypotheses,
but for most of our argument we shall assume them away. It may only be
noted that regulation establishes long-term monopoly positions favorable to
the Oi and Hurter argument for long-term contracts or vertical integration
as an insurance policy.
In order to show the relative merits of long-term transaction modes, it
is worthwhile to look first at local coal markets. They are defined to exist
where mining and consumption areas coincide. Here historically three trans-
action modes and combinations thereof dominate the relationship between coal
mining and consumption:
-11-
a) Vertical integration is found with respect to the American, German
and South African steel industries and partly with respect to
German4 and American electricity generation.
b) Public regulation or public ownership of coal mining is found in
Germany, the UK, France, and South Africa. In these cases coal
is normally bought under long-term contracts or through sequential
spot contracting with prices regulated.
c) Coal consumers are publicly owned or regulated. This holds for
nearly all electricity generation. It is of special importance in
the U.S. because here regulation after 1935 for a long time
seemingly has prevented large-scale vertical integration between
coal mining and electricity generation. In the U.S., transactions
between coal mining houses and power companies were until recently
predominantly on a long-term contractual basis.
A first hypothesis from this evidence is that, without regulation or
public ownership of either coal mines or coal consumers, vertical integra-
tion between the two would generally prevail in local coal markets. This
shall be explained using the four factors of the OFF.
2.2 Uncertainty/Complexity on Local Coal Markets
The role that uncertainty can play in coal markets is determined by the
amount, duration and specialization of capital investments in coal mining,
transportation and consumption facilities. The very fact that both consumer
groups may have to evaluate several investment opportunities against each
other, and that many issues besides coal procurement have to be taken into
consideration, makes it computationally comforting to have low uncertainties
in the investment decision, because its complexity rises tremendously
-12-
otherwise. One can argue that initially through computerization of invest-
ment planning this has even increased. The more accurately investments can
be planned from an engineering point of view, the better costs can be
evaluated. But this precision is worth little if the prices for inputs and
outputs are highly uncertain.
In planning to start a coal mine, a firm faces problems quite different
from the capacity investment decisions of coal consumers. Mining investment
costs vary considerably depending on geological conditions. An extremely
wide spread exists in the U.S., where mines may range from a few hundred
thousand to a hundred million dollars in initial investment. Already from
this broad range one would expect a variety of contracting modes on the local
U.S. coal markets. The importance of long-term relative to spot contracts
should be positively related to the size of initial investment and negatively
related to the age of a mine.
Furthermore, besides the higher expected mining costs of new mines as
compared to existing ones, actual results may differ substantially from those
in the engineering models used for cost projection. Costs have generally
proven to be higher than planned. This is usually taken care of by applying
high discount rates. It does not mean that coal mines cannot be planned.
Sample boreholes and knowledge about the general conditions of a mining area
may reveal substantial information. Still, natural conditions show a great
variety in many details which limits predictability. Mine development also
may take much longer than planned because of accidents or unexpected rock
formations, and faults can make coal seams partly unworkable.
In a special way, uncertainty of mining investments relates to govern-
ment. The general public is affected by mining through complementary
investments, employment problems, air pollution and energy availability. The
first three of these factors make local governments of coal districts
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interested in lowering demand uncertainty for coal in general and especially
with respect to new coal mining projects. A new mine (especially a surface
mine or a preparation plant) that destroys the natural environment can only
be defended publicly if the coal will be needed for certain. The same
argument holds if the government has to finance new roads, schools, hospitals,
etc., as a consequence of the sinking of a mine. Therefore, government will
only grant the necessary funds or the licenses to the mining investor if demand
uncertainty can be lowered. In particular, it can help for the customers to
be the local electric utility, because then both the environmental burdens
and the total benefits are spread over the inhabitants of the area.
2.3 Small Numbers Problems and Opportunism on Local Coal Markets
In local markets transportation cost differentials for coal restrict
the number of potential partners to transactions. By far the cheapest means
of transportation is a direct conveyor belt connection between mine and
consumer. This substantially saves both on handling and direct transporta-
tion costs. The transportation problem is especially severe for coal with
an inferior quality because large quantities of excess ballast have to be
transported. In general coal quality can be improved by preparation, but
this is a costly procedure and leaves a residuum of coal with even worse
quality attributes. Considering the economies of scale in electricity
generation and with no other customers left for coal of inferior quality, a
mine normally has no choice. It can only serve one or at most very few
electric utilities with this residual fraction of its output. On the other
hand, the utility may not want to integrate vertically and buy such a mine
because it then will have to bear the sales risks with regard to other groups
of customers. Unless there are government regulations to prevent it, one can
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predict that vertical integration between coal mines and electric utilities
will apply to mines that predominantly produce steam coal and long-term coal
6
contracts between power companies and other types of mines. This has to be
explained somewhat further: with transportation cost for electricity being
lower than for coal over short and medium distances (and within a network)
it is worth building electric power stations on top of coal mines. As power
stations and coal mines have roughly the same expected lifetimes, then at
least the investment planning of both has to be coordinated. This necessitates
a contract on the mutual simultaneous investment into a mine and a power
station. In theory, sequential spot contracts for single coal purchases
could follow afterwards. The price expectations, however, would be highly
uncertain because of
a) the existence of alternative outside opportunities (the bilateral
monopoly range) and
b) the possibility of bargaining within the bilateral monopoly range
generated by these opportunities.
Both kinds of uncertainty7 give rise to opportunism. They could be
narrowed down substantially through a long-term contract specifying prices
and quantities to be traded over the lifetime of the mine and the power
station. The difficulty is to find contract terms to cover future contin-
gencies in such a way that they are both complete and enforceable.8 The
customary procedure for long-term contracts is to provide exact and well-
enforceable clauses regarding events that are important for at least one of
the partners and not extremely unlikely to occur and to be vague with
regard to other events. Because long-term contracts are individualistic
products they also tend to be incomplete due to limited imagination and
experience of the partners. Therefore they will have to be adapted to
situations not covered by their wording. This is normally taken care of by
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negotiation clauses.
Long-term contracts designed to run for a decade or longer necessarily
involve times of tension when situations arise, in which outside opportunities
for the remainder of the contract term are deemed to be better for one
partner. This partner may therefore try to dishonor the old agreement and
either change the terms or abandon it altogether. The economic history of
the last hundred years reveals that in each decade unforseeable events
occurred which might have caused such desires and could have been used to
declare force majeure. 9 The fact that long-term contracts have still proved
to be viable shows that ex nunc outside opportunities were not seen
generally to provide long run advantages, or that vertical integration was
prevented by regulation.
2.4 Information Impactedness
Information impactedness is a factor of importance especially to the
mining side of the coal market. The mining company knows much more about the
geological conditions of the area where it wants to establish a mine than
both its customers and its bankers. 10 It can reveal information to both
groups in such a way that they would like to enter contracts. But with high
cost to verify the information, they may hesitate to do so. Now, if the
customer starts the mining project himself he can prove the information
through internal auditing. He can also convince bankers more easily to lend
capital to the mine because demand uncertainty for coal produced by the
future mine is close to nil and because consumers normally had the choice
between several alternatives. So the project has some superiority-by-
survival properties. In a weaker way this also holds if the consumer enters
a long-term contract and starts an investment project complementary to the
- -
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mine thus indicating that he holds trust in the project.
Vertical integration can be of different types. The revealed preference
of an agent for any particular type may be used as a signal by other agents.
Consider backward integration: the vast majority of mining properties are
not yet developed. An owner may sell mining land to an electric utility and
receive a predetermined fixed price. If at the outset he knows the quality
of the specific lot whereas the buyer knows the average quality of mining
land for sale one arrives at Akerlof's (1969) lemons story. Mining land
sold will on average be of lower quality than mining land developed by its
owner, because buyers' willingness to pay is based on this expectation.
Hence the owner of good mining will want to try forward integration as
an alternative strategy. This possibility, however, is limited by the
enormous capital required. For the goodwill of a mining company as a
borrower suffers from the same kind of information impactedness that make
selling a mine or mining land a lemons problem. Another possibility for
the land owner is to sell a property partly for cash and partly for a stock
option on shares of the buying company. This again is a compromise, because
the profits of the acquiring firm depend only in part on the quality of the
deposit, in other parts on its management and on risk factors.
In such a situation, how do long-term coal sales contracts compare with
vertical integration? First, assume that contracts can always be enforced.
Then an unconditional fixed price contract would only be a very simple though
unrealistic type of a complete contingent claims contract. However, all
contracts do involve some kinds of escape (force majeure) clauses. Even so,
the viability of fixed price contracts presupposes either large risk-taking
capabilities or stable conditions.
Such stable conditions pertained in the U.S. coal industry throughout
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the 50s and 60s, which was the high time of fixed price contracts. If the
expectations that originally lead to such contracts are not fulfilled because
spot price, and/or costs soar high, sellers tend to threaten not to deliver
any more. This was experienced in 1970 after the Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act induced mining cost increases and again in 1973/74 in connection
with the Arab Oil Embargo. Breach of contract is almost trivial when full
damages are paid (see however Diamond-Maskin, 1979), because then after the
breach nobody is worse off than before. This, however, is not the normal
situation. The breach of contract on the occasion of a crisis occurs,
because not all damages can be claimed, litigation is costly, its outcome
uncertain and the probability of bankruptcy strictly nonzero.
The risk-taking capabilities in fixed price contracts are probably
asymmetrically distributed between suppliers and consumers. If the risk of
mining cost is high compared to the risk of electricity demand, one may
expect the utility to bear part of the fixed price risk of the mine by paying
a risk premium above the expected competitive spot price and vice versa with
another risk distribution.
Vagueness of contract clauses creates some necessity to reach a new
agreement under some contingencies. Generally, there is a tradeoff between
the probability of breach of contract and its overall vagueness, assuming
that complete contingent claims contracts are infeasible anyway.ll
My own experience indicates cyclical movements in people's preferences
in favor of well defined contracts with high probability of breach as against
vague contracts with low probability. But a case for the general superiority
of the latter can be made on the ground that breach makes it extremely
difficult to reach a subsequent agreement for continuation even though there
may be no better partner.
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Hence, even though long-term contracts are often hard to enforce, they
will be rather immune to outright breach for at least two reasons: First,
the breaching partner loses credibility and reputation needed to conclude
other contracts. Such necessity usually increases with the size of the firm.
Thus horizontal and vertical integration can be substitutes to enable a
vertical transaction. Because goodwill-economies of-scale ordinarily are
linked to the number of customers served (or symmetrically:to the number of
suppliers needed), horizontal integration will become the preferred alternative
for idiosyncratic goods to be transacted only once between the same partners.
Nevertheless horizontal size also is important in the context of regularly
repeated transactions, because it transforms the limited time horizon of two
contract partners into the unlimited horizon of two firms, each having a
reputation. However, goodwill is at the same time a source of market power.
If potential partners expect to suffer from this, it has to be traded against
the probabilities of contract failure.
Secondly, the breaching partner usually will not be able to find a
better matching new partner, whenever the old contract relationship has
resulted in mutual specialized investment.
Still, renegotiation 12 and outright breach of long-term contracts do
occur. At first glance they reveal a severe failure of long-term contracts
as an institution. However, compare them to strikes, takeovers, mergers or
bankruptcies of vertically integrated firms. They do not shake the
institution. Rather the world moves on. Returning to the outset, the
willingness to enter a long-term contract signifies confidence by both sides
in their own operation. Otherwise they would rather sell out. To the
interested outsider it furthermore proves the confidence that the two parties
hold in each other by planning subsequent complementary investment. This
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becomes especially important to banks and shareholders who will finance the
investment projects.
2.5 Atmosphere
Williamson introduces atmosphere as a factor influencing the make or
buy decision via the preferences of people for market or hierarchical coor-
dination. In our example this may become more important for the attitudes
of executives than for the general employment relation with which Williamson
illustrates the point. If the chief executives of coal mines tend to be
mining engineers and those of electric utilities electrical engineers, these
companies are less likely to merge vertically than in the case where one of
them is a lawyer. The prediction from this is that whenever changes in the
other factors of the OFF occur, atmosphere will cause a lag in the adjust-
ment process. Assume that vertical integration prevails because it is
perceived to be optimal. Then management will not be specialized for one of
the production stages. If now a technical change makes disintegration
optimal, people working in the industry will at least partly try to resist.
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3. Is the OFF Applicable to Large Domestic Coal Markets and International
Coal Trade?
3.1 Large Domestic Coal Markets
Large domestic differs from local coal markets mainly by two features.
First, the advantage from specializing on a single supplier or customer
tends to decrease with an increase of the distance, because that reduces
the relative disadvantage of other suppliers. Secondly, due to larger
numbers, greater diversity and the distance itself, information about
relevant agents in the market becomes smaller for any individual agent as
the geographical market size increases.
Thus with geographical market size two of the three relevant economic
factors of the OFF move to favor vertical integration: information
impactedness and complexity/uncertainty tend to increase with distance. On
the other hand the small numbers problem becomes less severe. On balance,
this predominates. So vertical integration decreases, at least as far as
electric utilities or consumers are concerned. But long-term contracts keep
their importance. In this situation they offer two major advantages over
vertical integration. Management control becomes more difficult with
distance. More important, these are usually many projects to be evaluated
for a decision to integrate vertically. Each single evaluation is likely
to be more costly than to evaluate a contract proposal, because purchase
of a mine occurs now (undiscounted) and is final. Also, there will be more
lemons to sort out, whereas the self-selecting decision to enter or
continue production already screens potential long-term contract suppliers.
The latter item emphasizes a special feature in institutional analysis
related to the information impactedness argument. Information impactedness
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is the result of an irreversible historical process. If mining companies
already have the relevant information, backward integration by coal users
has to overcome the very information barrier that Williamson wants it to
eliminate. Expanding the limited amount of vertical integration of
Eastern coal in the U.S., thus quite probably would be suboptimal, whereas
for Western coal vertical integration comes in quite naturally.
3.2 International Coal Markets
The special features of international coal markets are13:
(1) Fluctuations in ocean freight rates and currency exchange rates
create shortterm arbitrage opportunities. These tend to limit
the scope of long-term commitments both of the contract and of
the vertical integration variety.
(2) Governments interfere with markets through special measures like
embargos or import restrictions. Neither contracts nor vertical
integration can usually prevent this. Only a diversified portfolio
of supply sources on the one and of customers on the other side
insures against such actions. Compared to the high setup costs
and large scale necessary for vertical integration, a diversified
contract portfolio is cheaper to build up. Contracts can be
split into small enough parcels. If firms are split up, either
economies of scale or voting power is lost. In both cases
efficiency is being sacrificed.
(3) International enforcement of both property rights and contracts
is more difficult than domestically. However, an international
reputation can be achieved by both buyers and sellers. This
goodwill makes long-term contracts feasible even with no power
legally to enforce them.
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Although the vertically integrated multinational company without doubt
is the most successful example for overcoming international transactional
problems it does not seem to provide the germane answer to coal procurement
requirements of electric utilities. The main reason for this is that
electric utilities are not normal private market oriented companies. They
cannot merge horizontally nor vertically across borders. So multinational
companies will be restricted to the coal mining and transportation stage,
trying to gain a reputation enabling them to conclude long-term contracts.
Thus the main limitation for applying Williamson's OFF to international
coal trade comes from the virtual impossibility of excluding state
intervention. This violates an implicit assumption of the Williamson
analysis.
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4. Evaluating the OFF
Wherever the transfer of a good between two stages of production occurs
simultaneously through vertical integration, long-term contracts and spot
purchases, any explanation for the dominance of one of these transaction
modes is likely to be wrong. Hence the choice of an empirical topic to test
a theoretical concept like the OFF could already be unfair. This holds
against the foregoing illustration but equally well against the examples
used by Williamson to discredit long-term contracts. We therefore conclude
at a more theoretical level of discussion. In my view, Williamson's OFF
indeed contains the main elements of failure for any human institution to
achieve efficiency. It clearly names and describes the transactional items
that matter. Its main achievements are completeness and simplicity. These
attributes gain increasing significance at a time where mathematical
institutional economics is progressing rapidly in a manner reminiscent of
the discovery of elementary particles in physics. New institutional properties
are discovered in large numbers without rendering the basis for a unified
approach. Williamson's OFF could prove to be just that.
In its full generality the framework cannot imply anything about the
relative superiority of a specific institution. Strange enough, Williamson
himself conveys the impression that his framework relates above all to
markets. He introduces it using market failure examples. When he comes to
discussing hierarchical failures of the firm, the OFF is somehow left aside.
Is e.g. ethical behavior among firm employees part of the "atmosphere"? It
remains rather unclear how the peculiar failures of the firm relate to the
OFF. Taking traditional economic thought as a guideline I submit that the
most prominent failure of markets is captured by the small numbers/opportunism
argument, whereas the most prominent failure of hierarchies lies in the
uncertainty 14/complexity issue. Both have their share in the information
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impactedness problem. Because these shares do not coincide, quite often
the firm can be the solution to the information impactedness problem of
the market and vice versa.
Should this brief assessment be correct, markets quite generally
will be used to relieve hierarchies from uncertainty/complexity. The
larger an internal organization becomes the greater is the necessity for
such a relief. Hence markets will be used for this purpose even if highly
imperfect by pure economic efficiency standards. This could explain both
the development of M-form enterprises and a willingness to accept highly
imperfect market relationships. Vice versa the firm will typically
replace markets in bilateral monopoly situations.
As empirical statements, these and those derived by Williamson still
lack the government as a third institution. Government holds power
virtually to effect any of the two outcomes of an OFF type analysis: markets
or hierarchies. Above all property rights are defined and enforced through
the state. With weak property rights on production facilities, the firm
is difficult to establish. Furthermore, the state may want to intervene
against market or hierarchical failure. But who decides what the
government can do? Williamson implicitly always uses a final goods market
as a yardstick and self-enforcement vehicle for the efficiency of a (vertical)
transaction mode. It is doubtful that voting mechanisms lead governments
to pursue a similar path.
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5. Conclusion
If coal mining and consumption areas coincide, vertical integration
between these two stages is usually efficient but often prevented by
government regulation.
Internationally, vertical integration between coal mining and consump-
tion calls for extremely large scale. Otherwise long-term contracts are
preferred because they allow for diversification. Contract terms in
general can be adapted to cope with new situations, although this involves
times of tension between the partners.
The essence of this paper is to show that although vertical integration
well be explained by Williamson's OFF, this is also true for long-term
contracts. It seems to be indeed difficult to formulate conditions from
which one and only one institution follows. For local coal markets, such
conditions seem to be fulfilled if government does not interfere directly,
whereas on a large national scale and in international coal trade, differing
institutional setups coexist. Markets and hierarchies both help to achieve
specialization. If this results in many parallel efforts, markets are
likely to be optimal. If it requires specific recurrent bilateral transac-
tions among the same partners, the firm will be superior provided the
complexity of organization can be handled. To overcome complexity
is a learning process which helps to explain why often economies of scale
grow over time.
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FOOTNOTES
1. It can be made more precise by relating opportunism to mobility (FitzRoy
and Mueller, 1977). Opportunism can be interpreted as the production
of wrong information in order to receive monopoly rents. Applying the
rent transformation argument by Posner (1975) on this topic reveals
that the possibility of opportunism may give rise to wasteful
expenditures by both partners to a transaction.
2. See Manove (1978) for an endogenous determination of optimal mine life.
3. This could be the result of mutual interdependence already.
4. In Germany forward vertical integration from coal mining into power
generation has developed for two reasons: coal mines need electricity
and they have to dispose of low grade coal, which is not marketable.
The first reason lost its importance through the increase in scale
economies for power plants. Today one such plant can supply a sizeable
number of coal mines. Hence, today the coal industry sells electricity
to the largest German electric utilities (RWE and VEW).
5. Or forbid sales to the market, if vertical integration occurs.
6. There can be economies of multi-plant operation for mines which jointly
own power stations (e.g. Ruhrkohle A.G. - Steag in Germany).
7. This corresponds to Radner's (1968) classification of uncertainty
relating to the environment and to acts of other agents.
8. "Focal points" (Schelling, 1960) are generally preferred to a complex
profit sharing rule.
9. This applies a fortiori to international long-term contracts but in
this case also to vertical integration.
10. Quality of coal is easier to prove from samples, although they may be
biased. To bankers, however, quality has much less meaning than to
customers. Therefore contracts with customers can be used as a signal
by bankers.
11. Incompleteness is a special kind of vagueness: the consequence of a
certain state of the world that may occur is undefined.
12. In a letter to the author, Richard Gordon stresses the importance of
renegotiations. They tend to occur during a crisis of a particular
contract type.
13. This is more extensively treated in Vogelsang (1979).
14. Opportunism relates to uncertainty in the sense that from the point of
view of others it creates the specific uncertainty of an agent's
behavior.
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